We study the profit maximization problem of a cognitive virtual network operator in a dynamic network environment. We consider a downlink OFDM communication system with various network dynamics, including dynamic user demands, uncertain sensing spectrum resources, dynamic spectrum prices, and time-varying channel conditions. In addition, heterogeneous users and imperfect sensing technology are incorporated to make the network model more realistic. By exploring the special structural of the problem, we develop a low-complexity online control policies that determine pricing and resource scheduling without knowing the statistics of dynamic network parameters. We show that the proposed algorithms can achieve arbitrarily close to the optimal profit with a proper tradeoff with the queuing delay.
INTRODUCTION
T HE limited wireless spectrum is becoming a bottleneck for meeting today's fast growing demands for wireless data services. More specifically, there is very little spectrum left that can be licensed to new wireless services and applications. However, extensive field measurements [2] showed that much of the licensed spectrum remains idle most of the time, even in densely populated metropolitan areas such as New York City and Chicago. A potential way to solve this dilemma is to manage and utilize the licensed spectrum resource in a more efficient way. This is why the concept of Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) has received enthusiastic support from governments and industries worldwide [3] , [4] , [5] . We can roughly classify various DSA approaches into two main categories: the spectrum sensing-based ones and the spectrum leasing (or market)-based ones. The first category indicates a hierarchical access model, where unlicensed secondary users opportunistically access the underutilized part of the licensed spectrum, with controlled interference to the licensed primary users. During this process, spectrum sensing helps the secondary users to detect the currently available spectrum resource. In contrast, the second category relates to a dynamic exclusive use model, which allows licensees to trade spectrum usage right to the secondary users. In both categories, it is possible to have a secondary operator coordinating the transmissions of multiple secondary users.
There are pros and cons for both DSA categories. Spectrum sensing detects and identifies the available unused licensed spectrum through technologies such as beacons, geolocation system, and cognitive radio. Form the secondary operator's perspective, the spectrum acquired by sensing is an unreliable resource, since it cannot determine how much resource is available before sensing. Furthermore, imperfect sensing may lead to collisions with primary users, and thus reduce the incentives for the licensee to share the spectrum. Therefore, the secondary operator needs to carefully design sensing and access algorithm to control the collision probability under an acceptable level. In dynamic spectrum leasing, a secondary operator acquires the exclusive right to use spectrum within a limited time period by paying the corresponding leasing price. Thus, the spectrum acquired by spectrum leasing is a reliable resource. However, the cost can be high compared to the spectrum-sensing cost, and is dynamically changing according to the demand and supply relationship in the market.
In this paper, we will consider a hybrid model, where a secondary operator obtains resources from the primary licensees through both spectrum-sensing and dynamic-spectrum leasing, and provides services to the secondary unlicensed users. Our study is motivated by Duan et al. [6] , [7] , in which the authors introduced the new concept of Cognitive Mobile Virtual Network Operator (C-MVNO). The C-MVNO is a generalization of the existing business model of MVNO [8] , which refers to the network operator who does not own a licensed frequency spectrum or even wireless infrastructure, but resells wireless services under its own brand name. The MVNO business model has been very successful after more than 10 years' development, and there are more than 600 MVNOs today [9] , [10] . The C-MVNO model generalizes the MVNO model with DSA technologies, which allow the virtual operator to obtain spectrum resources through both spectrum sensing and leasing. The C-MVNO model can be applied to a wild range of wireless scenarios. One example is the IEEE 802.22 standard [11] , which suggests that the cognitive radio network using white space in TV spectrum will operate on a point to multipoint basis (i.e., a base station to customer-premises equipments). Such a secondary base station can be operated by a C-MVNO.
The key difference between our work and the ones in [6] , [7] is that we study a much more realistic dynamic network in this paper. The authors of [6] , [7] formulated the problem based on a static network scenario, and provided interesting equilibrium results through a one-shot Stackelberg game. However, the real network is highly dynamic. For example, users arrive and leave the systems randomly, the statistics of spectrum availability changes over time, and the spectrum-sensing results are imperfect. Also the leasing price is often unpredictable and changing from time to time. These dynamics and realistic concerns make the network model and the corresponding analysis rather challenging.
In this paper, we focus on the Profit Maximization (PM) problem for C-MVNO in a dynamic network scenario. Our key results and contributions are summarized as follows:
. A dynamic network decision model. Our model incorporates various key dynamic aspects of a cognitive radio network and the dynamic decision process of a C-MVNO. We model sensing channel availability, leasing market price, and channel conditions as exogenous stochastic processes. . Dynamic user demands. We allow users to dynamically join the network with random demands (file sizes). The demand is affected by both the transmission prices (decision variables) and market states (exogenous stochastics). . Realistic cognitive radio model. We incorporate various practical issues such as imperfect spectrum sensing, primary users' collision tolerance, and sensing technology selection. The operator needs to choose a sensing technology to tradeoff between cost and performance. . A low-complexity online control policy. By exploiting the special structure of the problem, we design a low-complexity online pricing and resource allocation policy, which can achieve arbitrarily close to the operator's optimal profit. The policy does not require precise information of the dynamic network parameters, has a low system overhead, and is easy to implement. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the related work. In Section 3, we introduce the system model. Section 4 describes the problem formulation. In Section 5, we propose the Profit Maximization Control (PMC) policy for homogeneous users and analyze its performance. We further extend profit maximization control policy (M-PMC policy) to heterogeneous users in Section 6. Section 7 provides simulation results for both PMC and M-PMC polices. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 8.
RELATED WORK
Among the vast literature on cognitive radio, we will focus on the results on operator-oriented cognitive radio networks, where secondary operators play key roles in terms of coordinating the transmissions of the secondary users.
These studies only started to emerge recently, for example, [6] , [7] , [12] , [13] , [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] . We can further classify these studies into two clusters: monopoly models with one operator, and oligopoly models with multiple operators.
The authors of [6] , [7] , [12] , [13] studied monopoly models using the Stackelberg game formulation. Daoud et al. [12] proposed a profit-maximizing pricing strategy for uplink power control problem in wide-band cognitive radio networks. Yu et al. [13] proposed a pricing scheme that can guarantee a fair and efficient power allocation among the secondary users.
The authors of [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] looked at the oligopoly issues, either between two operators [14] , [15] or among many operators [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , [20] , [21] . For the case of two operators, Jia and Zhang [14] proposed a noncooperative two-stage game model to study the duopoly competition. Duan et al. [15] formulated the economic interaction among the spectrum owner, two secondary operators, and the users as a three-stage game. For the case of many operators, Ileri et al. [16] developed a noncooperative game to model competition of operators in a mixed commons/property-rights regime under the regulation of a spectrum policy server. Elias and Martignon [17] showed that polynomial pricing functions lead to unique and efficient Nash equilibrium for the two-stage Stackelberg game between network operators and secondary users. Niyato et al. [18] formulated an evolutionary game for modeling the dynamics of a multiple-seller, multiple-buyer spectrum trading market. In addition, several auction mechanisms were proposed to study the investment problems of cognitive network operators (e.g., [19] , [20] , [21] ).
All the results mentioned above considered a rather static network model. In contrast, our work adopts a dynamic network model to characterize the stochastic nature of wireless networks. We will focus on a monopoly model in this paper.
In this paper, we use Lyapunov stochastic optimization to show the optimality and stability of the proposed profit maximizing control algorithms. Several closely related previous results applying Lyaunov stochastic optimization to wireless networks include [22] , [23] , [24] . Huang and Neely [22] considered revenue maximization problem for a conventional wireless access point without considering the cognitive radio technologies. Urgaonkar and Neely [23] and Lotfinezhad et al. [24] studied cognitive radio networks based on a user-oriented approach, by designing joint scheduling and resource allocation algorithms to maximize the utility of a group of secondary users. Our paper focused on an operator-oriented approach to address profit maximization problem. In particular, we need to deal with the combinatorial problem of channel selection and channel assignment that usually leads to a high computational complexity. By discovering and utilizing the special problem structure, we design a low-complexity algorithm that is suitable for online implementation.
SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a C-MVNO that provides wireless communications services to its own secondary users by acquiring spectrum resource from some spectrum owner. For example, Google may acquire spectrum from AT&T to provide its own wireless services through the C-MVNO model. The spectrum owner's spectrum can be divided into two types: the sensing band and the leasing band. In the sensing band, AT&T serves its own primary users, but allows Google to identify available spectrum in this band through spectrum sensing without explicit communications with AT&T. In the leasing band, AT&T will does not allow spectrum sensing, and will lease the band to Google for economic returns.
More specifically, we consider a time-slotted OFDM system, where the C-MVNO serves the downlink transmissions from its base station to the secondary users. The system model is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Secondary users randomly arrive at the secondary network and request files with random sizes to be downloaded from the base station. This requested files are queued at the server in the base station until they are successfully transmitted to the requesting users.
The rest of the section introduces each part of the system model in more details. The C-MVNO (or "operator" for simplicity) obtains wireless channels through spectrum sensing (Sections 3.1 and 3.2) and spectrum leasing (Section 3.3), and allocates power over the obtained channels (Section 3.4). Secondary users dynamically arrive and request file downloading services (based on the demand model in Section 3.5), and we model the requests as a queue (Section 3.6).
Imperfect Spectrum Sensing
Sensing band B s max ¼ 4 f1; . . . ; B s max g includes all channels that the spectrum owner allows sensing by the operator. 1 We define the state of a channel i 2 B s max ðtÞ in time slot t as S i ðtÞ, which equals 0 if channel i is busy (being used by a primary user), and equals 1 if channel i is idle.
We assume that S i ðtÞ is an i.i.d. Bernoulli random variable, with an idle probability p 0 2 ð0; 1Þ and a busy probability 1 À p 0 . This approximates the reality well if the time slots for secondary transmissions are sufficiently long or the primary transmissions are highly bursty [27] . (We will further study the general Markovian model in Section 5.5.) We define the sensing state of a channel i 2 B s max in time slot t as W i ðtÞ, which equals to 0 if channel i is sensed busy, and 1 if sensed idle.
Notice that W i ðtÞ may not equal to S i ðtÞ due to imperfect sensing. The accuracy of spectrum sensing depends on the sensing technology [28] . If we denote C s as the sensing cost (per channel), 2 then we can write the false alarm probability as P fa ðC s Þ ¼ 4 P rfW i ¼ 0jS i ¼ 1g (same for all channel i) and the missed detection probability as P md ðC s Þ ¼ 4 P rfW i ¼ 1jS i ¼ 0g (same for all channel i). Both functions are decreasing in C s . Intuitively, a better technology will have a higher cost C s , a lower false alarm probability P fa ðC s Þ, and a lower missed detection probability P md ðC s Þ. We denote all choices of cost C s (and thus the corresponding sensing technologies) by a finite set C s . As different channels have different conditions (to be explained in details in Section 3.4), the operator needs to decide which channels to sense at the beginning of each time slot. We use B s ðtÞ to denote the set of channels sensed by the operator at time t, which satisfies
Collision Constraint
Missed detections in spectrum sensing lead to transmission collisions with the primary users. We denote the collision in channel i 2 B s max at time t as a binary random variable X i ðtÞ 2 f0; 1g. We have X i ðtÞ ¼ 4 ð1 À S i ðtÞÞW i ðtÞ, i.e., the collision happens if and only if the channel is busy but is sensed idle. To protect primary users' transmissions, the operator needs to ensure that the average collision in each channel i does not exceed a tolerable level i (measured in terms of the average number of collisions per unit time) specified by the spectrum owner. The tolerable level i can be channel specific, since the primary users in different channels may have different QoS requirements. We define the time-average number of collision in channel i as
The collision constraints are
Spectrum Leasing with a Dynamic Market Price
A spectrum owner may have some channels that do not want to be sensed, for either privacy reasons or the fear of collisions due to sensing errors. However, these channels may not be always fully utilized. The spectrum owner can lease the unused part of these channels to the operator dynamically over time to earn more revenue. Recall that we denote the set of these channels as the leasing band B l max ¼ 4 f1; . . . ; B l max g. (In general, we may represent it as B l max ðtÞ, since our model allows leasing band to be time varying. For the simplicity of notations, we denote it as 1. The operator will collect the sensing information from a sensor network or geolocation database and provide it to its users, i.e., providing "sensing as service" [25] , [26] . This means that the network can accommodate legacy mobile devices without cognitive radio capabilities. For more detailed discussions, see [7] .
2. The cost corresponds to, for example, power or time used for sensing.
B l max whenever it is clear.) We use B l i ðtÞ to denote the set of channels leased by the operator at time t, which satisfies
These channels will be exclusively used by the operator in the current time slot. We denote the leasing price per channel as C l ðtÞ, which stochastically changes according to the supply and demand relationship in the spectrum market (which might involve many spectrum owners and operators). It can be modeled by an exogenous (not affected by this particular operator's decisions) random process with countable discrete states and stationary distribution (not necessarily known by the operator).
Power Allocation
In wireless network, there are usually channel fading due to multipath propagation or shadowing from obstacles. To combat channel fading, it is necessary for the operator to do proper power allocation in both sensing channels and leasing channels to achieve satisfactory data rates. For each
represents its channel gain in time slot t and follows an i.i.d. distribution over time. Different channels have independent and possibly different channel gain distributions. We assume that secondary users are homogeneous and experience the same channel condition for the same channel. But channel conditions can be different in different channels. 3 (The heterogeneous user scenario will be further discussed in Section 6.) The operator can measure h i ðtÞ for each i at the beginning of each slot t, but may not know the distributions. Let P i ðtÞ denote the power allocated to channel i at time t. Since we consider a downlink case here, the operator needs to satisfy the total power constraint P max at its base station:
In addition, for a channel i 2 B s max in the sensing band, we use the binary variable I i ðtÞ ¼ 4 S i ðtÞW i ðtÞ to denote the transmission result of a secondary user, i.e., I i ðtÞ ¼ 1 if successful (i.e., S i ðtÞ ¼ 1 and W i ðtÞ ¼ 1) and I i ðtÞ ¼ 0 otherwise (either not sensed, or sensed busy, or sensed idle but actually busy). Based on the discussion of the leasing agreement, we have I i ðtÞ 1, i 2 B l max for all channel in leasing band. Then, the rate in channel i at time slot t is (based on the Shannon formula)
and total transmission rate obtained by the operator is
Furthermore, we assume that the operator has a finite maximum transmission rate, i.e., rðtÞ r max ; 8t, under any feasible power allocation.
Demand Model
We will focus on elastic data traffic in this paper. Secondary users randomly arrive at the network to request files with random and finite file sizes (measured in the number of packets) from the operator. A user will leave the network once it has downloaded the complete requested file. The operator can price the packet transmission dynamically over time, which will affect the users' arrival rate. For example, a higher price at peak time can refrain users from downloading files, as they can wait until a later time with a lower price. To model this, we use MðtÞ to denote the random market state, which can be measured precisely at the beginning of each time slot t and can help estimate the users demand. 4 The random variable is drawn from a finite set M over time in an i.i.d. fashion. The distribution of MðtÞ may not be known by the operator.
At a time t, the operator will decide whether to accept new file downloading requests from newly arrived secondary users. We define the binary demand control variable as OðtÞ, where OðtÞ ¼ 1 means that the operator accepts the incoming requests in time t, and OðtÞ ¼ 0 otherwise. When the operator decides to accept new requests of packet transmissions, it will also announce a price qðtÞ for transmitting one packet (to any user). This price will affect the users' incentives of downloading requests, for example, when price qðtÞ is high, some users may choose to postpone their requests.
More precisely, we denote the number of incoming users at time t as a discrete random variable NðtÞ ¼ 4 NðMðtÞ; qðtÞÞ 2 f0; 1; 2; . . .g, the distribution of which is a function of ransmission price qðtÞ and market state MðtÞ. Further, a user n's requested file size is denoted L n ðtÞ, with n 2 f1; 2; . . . ; NðqðtÞÞg, which is assumed to be independent of each other and does not depend on qðtÞ or MðtÞ. Moreover, we assume that users are using a set K ¼ f1; 2; . . . ; Kg of different applications, and denote k as the probability that an incoming user is using application k 2 K with P K k¼1 k ¼ 1. The distributions of the file length for different applications can be different, and we denote l k as the expected file length of application k 2 K.
To summarize, users' instantaneous demand at time t is
which is a random variable due to random file sizes and the random number of incoming users (even given qðtÞ and MðtÞ). We define the users' (expected) demand function as DðtÞ ¼ 4 DðMðtÞ; qðtÞÞ ¼ 4 IE ½AðMðtÞ; qðtÞÞ, and its value is completely determined by MðtÞ and qðtÞ. We can calculate that DðMðtÞ; qðtÞÞ ¼ IE ½NðMðtÞ; qðtÞÞ P k2K k l k . Then, it is reasonable to assume that the operator can rather accurately characterize the expected number of incoming users IE ½NðMðtÞ; qðtÞÞ through long-term observations. Thus, the demand function DðMðtÞ; qðtÞÞ is known by the operator. We further assume that the instantaneous demand is upper bounded as AðtÞ A max for all t, and that the demand function DðtÞ is nonnegative and nonincreasing function of the price qðtÞ. When the price is higher than some upper bound, i.e., qðtÞ ! q max , the demand function DðtÞ will be zero. The optimization of OðtÞ and qðtÞ based on the demand function will be further discussed in Section 5.2.1.
Queuing Dynamics
Since we focus on the profit maximization problem in this paper, we will take a simple view of the network and model users' dynamic arrivals and departures as a single server queue. When a user accesses the network, the corresponding file will be queued in a server at the base station, waiting to be transmitted to the user according to the First Come First Serve (FCFS) discipline. Shama and Lin [29] showed that the single server queue model is a good approximation for an OFDM system, especially when the number of users and channels are large.
We denote the queue length (i.e., the backlog, or the number of all packets from all queued files) at time t as QðtÞ. Thus, the queuing dynamic can be written as
where ðaÞ þ ¼ 4 maxða; 0Þ, rðtÞ and AðtÞ are the transmission rate and incoming rate at time t, and OðtÞ is the binary demand control variable (i.e., OðtÞ ¼ 1 means the operator admit the users' transmission requests at time t).
Throughout the paper, we adopt the following notion of queue stability: 
The time average profit is denoted as
IE ½RðtÞ:
All expectations in this paper are taken with respect to system parameters ðtÞ unless stated otherwise. We look at the profit maximization problem through pricing determination and resource allocations. At the beginning of each time slot t, the operator observes the value of ðtÞ and makes a decision ðtÞ to maximize the time average profit, subject to the system stability constraint (11) and the collision upper-bound requirement (12) . The profit maximization problem is formulated as
Variables ðtÞ 2 À ðtÞ ; 8t;
Parameters ðtÞ; 8t:
We represent its optimal solution as Ã ðtÞ ¼ ðO Ã ðtÞ; q Ã ðtÞ; C sÃ ðtÞ; B sÃ ðtÞ; B lÃ ðtÞ; P P Ã ðtÞÞ, and denote R Ã as the maximum profit. The PM problem is an infinite horizon stochastic optimization problem, which is in general hard to solve directly, especially when the distribution of dynamic parameter ðtÞ is unknown. For example, the future leasing price is hard to predict due to the dynamic supplies and demands in the market; and the primary users' activities cannot be estimated precisely beforehand.
PROFIT MAXIMIZATION CONTROL POLICY
Now, we adopt Lyapunov stochastic optimization technique to solve the PM problem.
Lyapunov Stochastic Optimization
We first introduce a virtual queue for constraint (12) , and then derive the optimal control policy to solve the PM problem through the technique of drift-plus-penalty function minimization [30] .
We denote Z i ðtÞ as the number of collisions happening in sensing channel i 2 B s max . The counter Z i ðtÞ can be understood as a "virtual queue," in which the incoming rate is X i ðtÞ, and the serving rate is i (the collision tolerant level). The queue dynamic is
with Z i ð0Þ ¼ 0. By this notion, if the virtual queue is stable, then it implies that the average incoming rate is no larger than the average serving rate. This is just the same as the collision upper-bound constraint (12) . We introduce the general queue length vector Â ÂðtÞ ¼ 4 fQðtÞ; Z ZðtÞg. We then define the Lyapunov function:
and the Lyapunov drift:
According to the Lyapunov stochastic optimization technique, we can obtain instantaneous control policy that can solve the PM problem though minimizing some upper bound of the following drift-plus-penalty function in every slot t:
There are two terms in the above function. The first term is the Lyapunov drift defined in (14) . It is shown by Lyapunov stochastic optimization [30] that we can achieve the system stabilities (i.e., constraints (11) and (12) of the PM problem) by showing the existence of a constant upper bound for the drift function. The second term in (15) is just the objective of the PM problem, i.e., to minimize the minus profit, which is equivalent to maximize the profit. Here, parameter V is introduced to achieve the desired tradeoff between profit and queuing delay in the control policy. We first find an upper bound for (15) . By the queue dynamic (8), we have
Qðt þ 1Þ 2 ðQðtÞ À rðtÞÞ 2 þ AðtÞ 2 þ 2QðtÞOðtÞAðtÞ
Similarly, for virtual queue (13), we have where D is a positive constant satisfying the following condition for all t: 
where we use the fact that collisions between secondary and primary users can only happen in channels that are chosen for sensing, i.e., i 2 B s ðtÞ. Next, we propose the profit maximization control policy to minimize the right-hand side of inequality (19) for each time t.
Profit Maximization Control Policy
It is clear that minimizing the right-hand side of (19) is equivalent to minimizing the last two terms in (19) . Note that the last two terms are decouple in decision variables; thus, we have the two parallel parts in the PMC policy as follows.
Revenue Maximization
Here, we determine two variables: the transmission price qðtÞ and the market control decision OðtÞ. The optimal transmission price qðtÞ is obtained by solving the following revenue maximization problem:
Maximize qðtÞD ðqðtÞ; MðtÞÞ À QðtÞ V DðqðtÞ; MðtÞÞ;
Variables qðtÞ ! 0:
To obtain the above problem formulation of revenue maximization, we use the fact that the demand function DðMðtÞ; qðtÞÞ ¼ 4 IE ½AðtÞ, which is independent of the queuing states of the system. Note that the first term in (20) is just the revenue that the operator collects from its users. The second term can be viewed as a shift of the queuing effect, which is introduced by the Lyapunov drift for system stability.
If the maximum objective in (20) (under the optimal choice of qðtÞ) is positive, the operator sets the demand control variable OðtÞ ¼ 1 and accepts the present incoming requests AðtÞ at the price qðtÞ. Otherwise, the operator sets OðtÞ ¼ 0 and rejects any new requests.
Cost Minimization
We determine channels selection BðtÞ, sensing technology (or cost) C s ðtÞ, and power allocation P P ðtÞ by solving the following optimization problem to control the costs of the operator to provide transmission services to its users:
Subject to ð1Þ; ð3Þ; ð4Þ
Variables C s ðtÞ; B s ðtÞ; B l ðtÞ; P i ðtÞ ! 0:
To obtain the above problem formulation of cost minimization, we use the fact that X i ðtÞ ¼ ð1 À S i ðtÞÞW i ðtÞ, which is independent of the queuing state. Thus, the virtual sensing cost can be updated as f C s ðtÞ ¼ C s ðtÞ þ ð1=V ÞZ i ðtÞð1 À p 0 ÞP md ðC s ðtÞÞ, which increases with the virtual queue and missed detection probability.
Note that the first term in the summation in (21) is the cost of each channel. The second term in the summation is a queuing-weighted expected transmission rate, again is a shift introduced by Lyapunov drift for system stability. This shift can be also viewed as the "gain" collected from the channel to help clear the queue.
Intuitions behind the PMC Policy
We discuss some intuitions behind the PMC policy. To maximize the profit, the operator needs to perform revenue maximization and cost minimization. To guarantee the queuing stability, some shifts (i.e., all queue-related terms) are introduced by the Lyapunov drift in these problems. In Appendix C, which can be found on the Computer Society Digital Library at http://doi.ieeecomputersociety.org/ 10.1109/TMC.2013.10 or in our technical report [31] , we show that the queuing effect will increase the optimal price announced by the operator (comparing with not considering queuing), as a higher price will reduce the users' demands and maintain the system stability.
The Lyapunov stochastic optimization approach provides a way to decompose a long-term average goal (e.g., the PM problem) into instantaneous optimization problems (e.g., revenue maximization and cost minimization problems in the PMC policy). In the stochastic optimization problem, the current decisions always have impacts on the future problems. These impacts are characterized and incorporated by the queuing shift terms in the instantaneous optimization problems. Therefore, we can achieve the long-term goal through focusing on the instantaneous decisions in every time slot. The flowchart for the PMC policy is illustrated in Fig. 2 .
Although the revenue maximization problem is relatively easy to solve, the cost minimization problem is very complicated. It is actually a two-stage decision problem. In the first stage, the operator determines the sensing technology, and chooses which channels to sense and which channels to lease. Then, spectrum sensing is performed to identify available channels. With this information, the operator further allocates downlink transmission power in the available channels (sensed idle ones and leasing ones). In Section 5.3, we focus on designing algorithms to solve the cost minimization problem.
Algorithms for Cost Minimization Problem
Now, we use backward induction to solve the cost minimization problem.
The Second Stage Problem
We first analyze the power allocation in the second stage, where the sensing results W i ðtÞ, the channel selection B s ðtÞ, and the sensing technology C s ðtÞ have been determined. Therefore, the power allocation problem of (21) is as follows: 
By using the Lagrange duality theory, we can show that the problem (22) has the following optimal solution:
where ðtÞ is the Lagrange multiplier of the total power constraint (4). The optimal value of ðtÞ is the following water filling solution:
where B p ðtÞ ¼ 4 fi 2 BðtÞ : P i ðtÞ > 0g. Note that (26) is a fixed-point equation of ðtÞ, and the precise value of ðtÞ is not given here.
When the values of all parameters (i.e., h i ðtÞ; ! i ðtÞ) are given, we can use a simple water level searching Algorithm 1 (which is similar to the searching algorithms in [32] , [33] ) to determine the exact optimal value of ðtÞ. In the following pseudocode of Algorithm 1, we define a function ÃðmÞ as follows: The main complexity in this algorithm is to sort the channels according to the channel gains. We can adopt established sorting algorithms [34] to obtain the index rearrangement with a complexity OðjB max j logðjB max jÞÞ. Thus, the total complexity of Algorithm 1 is OðjB max j 3 logðjB max jÞÞ.
The First Stage Problem
Let us consider the first stage problem to determine the sensing technology, the sensing set, and the leasing set. Note that because the sensing has not been performed at this stage yet, thus the sensing result W i ðtÞ is not known. We denote
and we can calculate
Substitute the optimal power allocation (25) into the problem (21) We first consider the above problem for a fixed sensing cost C s ðtÞ. This problem is a combinatorial optimization problem of B s ðtÞ and B s ðtÞ. The worst case of searching complexity (i.e., exhaustive searching) can be Oð2 jBmaxj Þ, exponential in the number of total channels. However, we can reduce the complexity by exploring the special structure of this problem.
Proposition 1 (Threshold Property).
. We rearrange the leasing channel indices i 2 B l max in the decreasing order of g i ðtÞ, which is defined as
There exists a threshold index i l th , such that a channel i is chosen for leasing (i.e., i 2 B l ðtÞ) if and only if i i l th . . We rearrange the sensing channel indices j 2 B s max in the decreasing order of g j ðtÞ, which is defined as
For all leasing channels j 2 B s max , there exists a threshold index j s th , such that a channel j is chosen for sensing (i.e., j 2 B s ðtÞ) if and only if j j s th . Proof. For each channel in the optimal channel selection set i 2 B Ã ðtÞ, it satisfies the following condition:
This result is easy to see from the objective function in (29) : to optimize the profit, we should only pick the channel with its cost no larger than its gain. Thus, by (30) and (31), the optimization problem in (29) can be written in the following equivalent form: Thus, by the log function in the objective of (33), the threshold property immediately follows. t u
This proposition suggests that we should select the channel with a large g i (for leasing channels) or g j (for sensing channels). Note that as defined in (30) and (31), g i and g j are equal to channel information (i.e., h i for leasing channels, ! j h j for sensing channels) multiplying a decaying factor related to the channel cost. They can be understood as virtual channel gains by taking channel costs into consideration. A large value of g i or g j means that the channel is cost-effective, i.e., the channel has a good channel gain as well as a low cost.
By Proposition 1, it is clear that we can obtain the optimal channel selection by an exhaustive search of the optimal sensing and leasing thresholds. Algorithm 2 gives a pseudocode for the searching procedure. In Algorithm 2, Uði; jÞ denotes the optimal value of (33) with the channel selection set
To decrease the number of searching loops, we can first run Algorithm 5 (i.e., the Procedure SearchingThreshold(C s ) in Algorithm 2, see Appendix C, available in the online supplemental material or in our technical report [31] ) to determine the maximum possible thresholds Ç l for leasing channels or Ç s for sensing channels. (If we do not run Algorithm 5 , we can just set Ç l ¼ jB l max j and Ç s ¼ jB s max j. Whether we run Algorithm 5 or not, the complexity of Algorithm 2 is no worse than OðjB s max j Â jB l max jÞ.) Thus, the searching complexity is reduced to OðjB max j 2 Þ, given the channel indices are rearranged as in the Proposition 1. We can adopt established sorting algorithms [34] to obtain the index rearrangement with a complexity OðjB max j logðjB max jÞÞ.
Thus, the total complexity of finding the optimal channel selection is OðjB max j 3 logðjB max jÞÞ.
Note that in real systems, the channel conditions and the leasing cost may not change as frequently as every time slot. We usually can update these network parameters every time frame (which is composed by several time slots instead of one time slot). Accordingly, the above algorithm will also be operated based on the time frames, which will greatly reduce the computation complexity in practice.
Furthermore, let us find the optimal sensing cost C s ðtÞ by enumerating all possible sensing costs C s ðtÞ 2 C s . For the sensing cost C s ðtÞ, we denote the objective value in (33) as UðC s ðtÞÞ and the optimal channel selection set as BðC s ðtÞÞ. The corresponding pseudocode is given in Algorithm 3, the complexity of which is OðjCj Â jB max j 3 logðjB max jÞÞ. 1: U Ã 0 2: for C s ðtÞ 2 C s do 3:
Determine the optimal channel selection BðC s ðtÞÞ (see Algorithm 2) 4:
Calculate UðC s ðtÞÞ 5:
if U Ã > U then 6:
U Ã U, C sÃ ðtÞ C s ðtÞ, B Ã ðtÞ BðC s ðtÞÞ 7:
end if 8: end for So far, we have completely solved the two-stage optimization problem in (21) . For each time t, the operator first runs Algorithm 3 to choose the channel sets B Ã ðtÞ ¼ B sÃ ðtÞ [ B lÃ ðtÞ. Then, it uses the sensing technology with a cost C sÃ ðtÞ to sense channels in B sÃ ðtÞ. Based on the sensing results, it further runs Algorithm 1 to determine the power allocation P Ã i ðtÞ; i 2 B Ã ðtÞ.
Sensing versus Leasing
We are also interested in how the PMC policy makes the best tradeoff between sensing and leasing based on the sensing cost C s ðtÞ and the leasing cost C l ðtÞ. To make the comparison easy to understand, we will consider perfect sensing with no sensing errors (i.e., ! 0 ¼ 1 and 0 ¼ p 0 ). We will further assume that a leasing channel i and a sensing channel j have the same channel gain h i ðtÞ ¼ h j ðtÞ. Finally, we assume that two channels have the same availabilityprice-ratio, i.e., the costs satisfy C s ðtÞ ¼ 0 C l ðtÞ. We want to answer the following question: is the PMC policy indifferent in choosing either of the two channel? By (30) and (31), we have g i ¼ g j for these two channels. By (33) , we can calculate the net gains by channel i and j : log g i ðtÞ ðtÞ þ ! 0 log g j ðtÞ ðtÞ þ :
To maximize the objective in (33) , it is clear that PMC policy will prefer the leasing channel i over the sensing channel j, and this tendency increases as 0 decreases. If we view the channel unavailability ð1 À 0 Þ as the risk of choosing the sensing channel, then the PMC policy is a risk averse one. This is mainly due to the concavity of the rate function. This preference order will also hold in the imperfect sensing case, in which case we will have g i > g j and ðlogð giðtÞ ðtÞ ÞÞ þ ! 0 ðlogð g j ðtÞ ðtÞ ÞÞ þ .
Performance of the PMC Policy
We can characterize the performance of the PMC Policy as follows:
Theorem 1. For any positive value V , the PMC Policy has the following properties:
. The queue stability (11) and collision constraints (12) are satisfied. The queue length is upper bounded by
and the virtual queue length is upper bounded by
where
. The average profit R P MC obtained by the PMC policy satisfies
where R Ã is the optimal value of the PM problem.
According to the Little's law, the average queuing delay is proportional to the queue length. Thus, users experience bounded queuing delays under the PMC algorithm by (34) . By (36), we find that the profit obtained by the PMC Policy can be made closer to the optimal profit by increasing V . However, as V increases, the queuing delay also increases as shown in (34) . The best choice of V depends on the desired tradeoff between queuing delay and profit optimality.
A detailed proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendices A and B, available in the online supplemental material, and our technical report [31] .
Extension: More General Model of Primary Activities
In the previous analysis, we have assumed that primary users' activities in each sensing channel follow a simple i.i.d. Bernoulli random process. Next, we will show that the PMC policy can be easily adapted to the more general Markov chain model of the primary users' activities shown in Fig. 3 . In this model, for any time t, S i ðtÞ is unknown, but the history information S i ðt À 1Þ is known, and also the transition probabilities P rðS i ðtÞ ¼ s 0 jS i ðt À 1Þ ¼ sÞ ¼ 4 p i s!s 0 ; s 2 f0; 1g; s 0 2 f0; 1g; i 2 B s max are known from long-time statistics. All previous analysis for PMC policy will still hold if we update two parameters ! i ðtÞ and i ðtÞ as follows: where IE ½S i ðtÞW i ðtÞ j S i ðt À 1Þ ¼ s ¼ p i s!1 ð1 À P fa ðC s ðtÞÞÞ: There is no change in the revenue maximization part, and the cost minimization part still involves a combinatorial optimization problem. But the complexity of solving cost minimization problem becomes OðjCj Â 2 jB s max j jB l max þ 1jÞ, since we lose the structure information in sensing channels, i.e., the threshold structure does not hold for sensing channels. In the worst case (B max ¼ B s max , B l max ¼ ;), it comes back to OðjCj Â 2 jBmaxj Þ, which is the complexity of the exhaustive search without considering the threshold structure.
Let us further consider a special Markov chain model, where the transition probability for each sensing channel is the same, i.e., P rðS i ðtÞ ¼ s 0 jS i ðt À 1Þ ¼ sÞ ¼ 4 p s!s 0 ; 8i 2 B s max . In this model, all sensing channels can be categorized into two types, channels being busy in the last slot (i.e., S i ðt À 1Þ ¼ 0), or channels being idle in the last slot (i.e., S i ðt À 1Þ ¼ 1). We can still show threshold structures for both types. Thus, the complexity is reduced to OðjCj Â jB max j 4 logðjB max jÞÞ.
The above analysis shows that it is critical to exploit the problem structure to reduce the algorithm complexity.
HETEROGENEOUS USERS
In Section 4, we adopt the single queue analysis for homogeneous users who are assumed to be located nearby and have the same channel condition on each channel. However, the single queue analysis no longer works for a more general scenario of heterogeneous users, where users can be located at different places, and have different channel conditions. In this section, we introduce the multiqueue model to deal with the heterogeneous user scenario as shown in Fig. 4 .
We divide the total coverage of the secondary base station into J ¼ 4 f1; 2; . . . ; Jg disjoint small areas (illustrated as hexagons in Fig. 4) according to users' different channel experiences. Users in one of these small areas are nearby homogeneous users. They share the same channel conditions, and form a queue based on the FCFS discipline. We use Q j ðtÞ to denote the queue length in area j. Since the queue and the corresponding area is one-to-one mapping, we also call the users in area j as queue j users.
For each queue j 2 J , h ij ðtÞ represents the users' channel gain to channel i 2 B max at time t, which follows an i.i.d distribution over time. The indicator variable T ij ðtÞ 2 f0; 1g denotes the operator's channel assignment at time t: T ij ðtÞ ¼ 1 if channel i is allocated to queue j, and T ij ðtÞ ¼ 0 otherwise. Meanwhile, the assignment T ij must satisfy X j2J T ij ðtÞ 1; 8t: ð37Þ
The power allocation for queue j on channel i is denoted by P ij ðtÞ. The total power allocation must satisfy X j2J X i2Bmax P ij ðtÞ P max ; 8t:
Thus, the rate of queue j 2 J can be calculated
where I i ðtÞ is the transmission result in channel i, following the same definition in Section 3.4. For each queue j, we follow the same demand model as in Section 3.5 for homogenous users. We assume the number of incoming users, the market state, and the user's instantaneous demand are i.i.d among different queues, and denote them as N j ðtÞ, M j ðtÞ, and A j ðtÞ, respectively. The market control variable and price for queue j are denoted as O j ðtÞ and q j ðtÞ. The queuing dynamic for queue j is as follows:
Thus, the homogeneous user model in Section 4 can also be viewed as a special case of the heterogeneous user model, where J is a singleton.
Multiqueue Profit Maximization Control Policy 6.1.1 Revenue Maximization
For any queue j 2 J , we compute the optimal transmission price q Ã j ðtÞ by solving the following problem:
Maximize q j ðtÞ À Q j ðtÞ V Dðq j ðtÞ; M j ðtÞÞ ð41Þ
Variables q j ðtÞ ! 0:
If the maximum objective in (41) is positive, the operator sets transmission control variable O Ã j ðtÞ ¼ 1 and accepts users' new file download requests at the price q Ã j ðtÞ. Otherwise, the operator sets O Ã j ðtÞ ¼ 0 and rejects any new requests.
Cost Minimization
We solve the following optimization problem to determine sensing cost and resource allocation:
Subject to ð1Þ; ð3Þ; ð38Þ; ð37Þ
Variables C s ðtÞ; B s ðtÞ; B l ðtÞ; P ij ðtÞ ! 0; T ij ðtÞ 2 f0; 1g;
where the cost C i ðtÞ follows the same definition of (18) .
Similar to the homogenous model in Section 5.3, it is a twostage decision problem. In the first stage, we determine the sensing technology, and choose the sensing channels and the leasing channels. Then, in the second stage, we determine the channel assignment and power allocation based on the sensing results. We use backward induction to solve this problem (42). To simplify the notation, we will ignore the time index in the following analysis. We first analyze the channel assignment and power allocation in the second stage. In this stage, since the sensing results W i , the channels B s , and the sensing technology C s are determined, the second stage problem of (21) is shown as follows:
Subject to ð38Þ; ð37Þ Variables P ij ! 0; T ij 2 f0; 1g;
where ! i follows the same definition of (23). Compared to the power allocation problem in (22) , the binary channel assignment variables T ij s make the second stage problem in (43) much more complex.
We first solve problem (43) assuming fixed T ij s, in which case the power allocation problem is a convex optimization problem. Following the same method of solving power allocation for homogeneous users as in (25), we have
where is the Lagrange multiplier of the total power constraint (38), which satisfies
where B p ¼ 4 fi 2 B : P ij > 0g. When T ij is known, we can design a simple search algorithm similar to Algorithm 1 to determine the optimal value of .
We then substitute this result in (43), and further maximize the objective over T ij s. Then, we have
Subject to X j2J T ij 1
Variables T ij 2 f0; 1g:
For each channel i 2 B, let us denote the set
Here, the solution J Ã i is a set of indices of the chosen queues. If J Ã i is a singleton, then we denote its unique element as j Ã i . If J Ã is not singleton, since all elements in J Ã lead to the same value in objective, then we can randomly pick one of the its element and denote it as j Ã i . Since the objective in problem (46) is linear in T ij , it is easy to see the optimal solution is
Now, let us consider how to calculate the value of and j Ã i . By (45) and (47), we find that they are actually coupled together. To determine in (45), we need to know T ij (or equivalently J Ã i , j Ã i ), i.e., which queue is chosen for which channel. But determining J Ã i in (47) requires the value of . One way to solve this problem is to enumerate every possible channel assignment combinations to find the solutions satisfying both (45) and (47). Since each channel i 2 B max can be assigned to one of J queues, there are a total of jB max j J channel assignment combinations. When the J or jB max j is large, the complexity can be very high. However, we can reduce the search complexity by exploring the special structure of the problem. Property 1. For each channel allocated positive power i 2 B p , we have
This property comes from (47). This means that for a particular channel i, if the channel gain for the longest queue Q j is good enough (i.e., h ij > Q j ! i ), we should assign channel i to queue with the longest queue length. If J Ã i is a singleton, then we denote its unique element as j Ã i . Otherwise, we denoteĴ Ã i ¼ 4 arg max fh ij j j 2 J Ã i g. In this case, there are multiple channels with the same channel gain and the same queue length, and we can randomly pick one and denote it as j Ã i . Thus, we can search and J Ã i (and also j Ã i ) by a simple greedy algorithm as follows: First, for all channels, we assume J Ã i ¼ arg max j2J Q j , and calculate the value of by the waterfilling algorithm (as the procedure "Waterfilling" in Algorithm 4). For each unchosen channel, i.e., the channel i with ! i Q j Ã i h ij Ã i , we check whether ! i Q j h ij > can be satisfied when another queue is chosen instead of j Ã i . If there is some setJ i of queues satisfying ! i Q j h ij > , we replace J Ã i with the one with the longest queue length in this set, i.e., arg max j2J i Q j . We repeat the process iteratively until we find the and j Ã i that satisfies both (45) and (47). The pseudocode is given in Algorithm 4.
To simplify the expression of Algorithm 4, with a little abuse of notations, we denote The complexity of Algorithm 4 is OðjB max j 3 logðjB max jÞ, since the while loop runs no more than jB max j times in the worst case, and the complexity of waterfilling part is OðjB max j 2 logðjB max jÞ (the same as the waterfilling power allocation algorithm in Section 5.3.1). Compared to the exhaustive search, the complexity of solving the channel assignment is greatly reduced.
With the solution of channel assignment, we can update the power allocation solution of (42) as
( where the value of , h i , and Q i are calculated by Algorithm 4. After solving the second stage problem, we move to the first stage. Following the channel assignment in (48), we find that the first stage problem for the heterogeneous users is the same with the one of homogeneous user's problem in (29) . We can simply run the same Algorithm 3 to determine sensing technology C sÃ ðtÞ, sensing channel set B sÃ ðtÞ, and leasing channel set B lÃ ðtÞ.
The Performance of M-PMC Policy
Next, we show the performance bounds of the M-PMC Policy. The proof method is similar to that of Theorem 1, and the details are omitted due to space limit.
Theorem 2. For any positive value V , the M-PMC Policy has the following properties:
1. The queue stability (11) and collision constraints (12) are satisfied. The queue length is upper bounded by
and the virtual queues are bounded by
, and C s0 denotes the highest sensing cost. 2. The average profit R MÀP MC obtained by the M-PMC policy satisfies
where R Ã is the optimal value of the multiqueue PM problem.
SIMULATION
In this section, we provide simulation results for PMC and M-PMC policies. We conduct simulations with the following parameters. The number of incoming users in each slot satisfies a Poisson distribution with a rate DðqðtÞ; MðtÞÞ ¼ 1 MðtÞ ðqðtÞ À 5Þ 2 . The market state MðtÞ satisfies Bernoulli distribution, MðtÞ ¼ 1 with probability 0.5, and MðtÞ ¼ 2 with probability 0.5. The file length of each user satisfies the i.i.d. (discrete) uniform distribution between 1 and 10. There are 32 channels in total. Twenty of them belong to the sensing band B s max , and the rest 12 channels belong to the leasing band B l max . The primary collision probability tolerant levels are set as i ¼ 0:001 for sensing channel i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 10, and i ¼ 0:005 for sensing channel i ¼ 11; 12; . . . ; 20. The channel gain h i of each channel satisfies i.i.d. (continuous) Rayleigh distribution with parameter ¼ 4:5. The total power constraint of the base station is P max ¼ 8. There are three different sensing technologies with costs C s ¼ f0 ðnot sensing at allÞ; 0:1; 0:5g. The corresponding false alarm probabilities are P fa ¼ f0:5; 0:1; 0:008g, and the missed detection probabilities are P md ¼ f0:5; 0:08; 0:005g. We assume the idle time probability of sensing band p 0 is 0.6, and the control parameter V 2 f5; 10; 50; 100; 200g. Fig. 5 shows a collision situation of all sensing channels with the control parameter V ¼ 100. We find that primary users' collision tolerant bound (12) is satisfied as time increases. We also find that we obtain similar curves for the collision probabilities with other values of control parameter V . Fig. 6a shows that the average queue length grows linearly in V , and is always less than the worst case bound V q max þ A max . Fig. 6b shows that the average profit achieved by PMC policy converges quickly as V grows, and is close to the maximum profit when V ! 100.
We further vary the idle time probability of sensing band p 0 from 0 to 1. In Fig. 7 , we show the average profit with different sensing available probabilities p 0 2 ½0; 1 and different fixed sensing technologies. The black curve is with zero sensing cost, where P fa ¼ P md ¼ 0:5, which means the operator does not perform sensing and takes random guesses of primary users' activities in sensing channels. The blue curve is with the low sensing cost 0.1, where P fa ¼ 0:1 and P md ¼ 0:08. The purple curve is with the high sensing cost 0.5, where P fa ¼ 0:008 and P md ¼ 0:005. The red curve is the PMC policy, which adaptively choose sensing cost from the above three (sensing cost C s ¼ 0; 0:1; 0:5). When the sensing available probability is small (e.g., p 0 2 ½0; 0:2), all strategies tend to only choose the leasing channels, thus all curves obtain similar profits. When the sensing available probability p 0 further increases, the advantage of exploring sensing channels becomes more significant. The performances for strategies using the zero and low sensing cost are not good. The reason is that their detection accuracy is not good enough. To achieve the primary users' collision bounds, these strategies choose sensing channels less often, and replace with more expensive leasing channels. When the sensing available probability is high and close to 1, sensing seems unnecessary. Therefore, the performance increases as sensing cost decreases, where the zero cost is the best and the high cost is the worst. The PMC policy (the red curve) adaptively chooses the sensing cost, i.e., when p 0 is medium, it utilizes the high sensing cost strategy in most of time slots; as p 0 keeps increasing, it gradually changes to utilize the low cost and zero cost strategies more frequently; and when p 0 goes to 1, it utilizes the zero sensing cost strategy in most of time slots. It has the best performance, since it can take advantage of different sensing technologies for different sensing available probabilities.
For the M-PMC policy, we conduct simulations for a simple two-queue system. For queue-1, the channel gain h i1 of each channel satisfies i.i.d. (continuous) Rayleigh distributions with parameter ¼ 4:5. For queue-2, the channel gain h i2 of each channel satisfies i.i.d. (continuous) Rayleigh distributions with parameter ¼ 5:5. This is because queue-2 users are closer to the operator's base station than queue-1 users. Fig. 8a shows that the average transmission rate obtained by queue-2 users is higher than that of the queue-1 users. This is because queue-2 users usually have better channel conditions, and M-PMC policy prefers to allocate more powers to better channels to improve the transmission rate. Fig. 8b shows that the revenues obtained by the operator from users of two queues are almost the same when all queues are stable. It is an interesting observation. We can understand it in this way: when two queues make different revenue, to maximize the profit (also the revenue), the operator will allocate more transmission rates to the queue with a higher revenue. Thus, the length of the queue with a higher transmission rate will be shortened, and the negative queuing effect in revenue maximization problem will be soon diluted. It further leads to a decreasing price and a decreasing revenue. In contrast, the length of the queue with a lower transmission rate increases, which results in an increasing price and an increasing revenue. Therefore, when all queues are stable finally, the average revenue generated by each queue is the same. In this paper, we study the profit maximization problem of a cognitive mobile virtual network operator in a dynamic network environment. We propose low-complexity PMC and M-PMC policies that perform both revenue maximization with pricing and market control, and cost minimization with proper resource investment and allocation. We show that these policies can achieve arbitrarily close to the optimal profit, and have flexible tradeoffs between profit optimality and queuing delay.
We also find several interesting features in these close-tooptimal policies. In revenue maximization, the dynamic pricing strategy performs the functionality of congestion control to users' demands, i.e., the longer the queue length of demands, the higher price the operator should charge. In cost minimization, the operator is risk averse toward spectrum investment, and prefers stable leasing spectrum to unstable sensing spectrum with the same channel condition and the same availability-price-ratio.
In this paper, we only focus on the issue of elastic traffic. For future work, it would be worthwhile to incorporate inelastic traffic, which usually has strict constraints on transmission rates and delays. Typical examples include real-time multimedia applications, for example, audio streaming, video on demand (VoD), and voice over IP (VoIP). In the most general case, we can consider a hybrid system with both elastic and inelastic traffic, which is more realistic and practical. In addition, as mentioned in Section 2, the literature about competition in cognitive radio networks mainly focus on the static network scenario. It is also interesting to extend our dynamic model to incorporate competition among several network operators.
